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Abstract
This study applies data from a web-based survey administered to Alaska sport fish license holders 
in 2017 to examine the newly introduced Recreational Quota Entity (RQE) program in Alaska's guided 
halibut sport fishery and the possibility of increasing halibut available to sport anglers by funding this 
program through a state-endorsed halibut stamp. Two valuation questions were randomized amongst the 
survey sample. The questions were designed to elicit willingness to pay (WTP) for a halibut stamp in 
support of the RQE program under (1) status quo halibut fishing regulations (2) more relaxed charter 
halibut fishing regulations made possible through revenues from halibut stamp sales. The need for two 
valuation questions is in response to the many factors that would ultimately determine the degree to which 
charter fishing regulations could be relaxed and the time needed for regulatory change made possible 
through revenues from halibut stamp sales. The findings indicate that non-resident anglers and resident 
anglers have a very similar WTP for a state-endorsed halibut stamp and that anglers are willing to pay for 
a halibut stamp despite having little or no history of participation in the halibut fishery. The pairwise 
comparison among mean WTP estimates from both valuation questions indicates that differences in 
anglers' WTP are inconsequential. Findings suggest that the WTP for a state-endorsed halibut stamp 
reflects an interest in preserving access to the fishery or the value of reserving an option to participate in 
the halibut fishery. Respondent education level and employment status were found to be statistically 
significant determinants of anglers' willingness to pay for a state-endorsed halibut stamp to support the 
RQE program.
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1. Introduction
A recently adopted management program in Alaska's charter halibut sport fishery aims to provide 
a market-based mechanism to facilitate the compensated reallocation of commercial halibut quota to the 
sport fishing sector (82 FR 46016). The reallocation could allow catch regulations to be liberalized for 
charter halibut anglers (82 FR 46016). The following analysis is based on responses to a web-based 
survey that was administered in Fall 2018 to 10,021 holders of a 2017 Alaska sport fish license (5,017 
resident and 5,004 non-resident). Respondents were asked to provide information about their fishing 
experience in Alaska and about some of their social and demographic characteristics. In addition, 
respondents were asked to respond to contingent valuation (CV) questions designed to elicit the 
maximum value they would be willing to pay (WTP) for a state-endorsed halibut stamp if it were required 
to fish for halibut in Alaska. Respondents were given one of two valuation questions to evaluate WTP for 
a state-endorsed halibut stamp. In one version of the CV question, respondents were queried about their 
WTP for a state-endorsed halibut stamp under status quo charter-fishing regulations. In the second 
version of the CV question, respondents were asked about their WTP for a state-endorsed halibut stamp 
under charter halibut fishing regulations relaxed to the more liberal levels that currently apply to unguided 
anglers; two fish of any size in Area 3A. While the RQE program is intended to collect funds in support 
of enough halibut purchases to relax charter halibut fishing regulations, the actual extent of regulatory 
change will also depend on other factors and is unlikely to be implemented in the same year that anglers' 
purchase a halibut stamp. All respondents were informed that revenues generated from halibut stamp 
sales would be dedicated to the RQE program to relax fishing regulations for charter halibut anglers. The 
WTP bids were elicited through the payment card method originally introduced by Mitchell and Carson 
(1981), (e.g., $0 to $100 in $10 increments) (Boyle 2003). The range of values included in the survey was 
selected based on the results of a pilot survey. The indicated WTP was assumed to represent the 
respondent's upper threshold; and the next lowest bid option was treated as an estimate of the lower 
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bound of their WTP. The empirical analysis applies an Interval Regression model (Stewart 1983) and 
maximum likelihood methods to investigate the determinants of WTP.
The next section briefly describes the policy and regulatory background for the halibut 
commercial and sport fisheries in Alaska and development of the RQE program. The third section 
explores the need for an RQE-type program in various limited entry fisheries given the challenges faced 
in allocating catch between commercial and sport fishing sectors. Section 4 describes the empirical model 
used for data analysis of the survey responses. Data collection methods and an overview of the data are 
reported in Section 5. Results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 includes conclusions and discussion.
2. Background
Halibut fishing is permitted throughout marine waters off the United States and Canada from 
California to Alaska. The International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) is mandated to manage the 
halibut stock to maximize sustainable yield in ten regulatory Areas, eight (Areas 2C-4E) off Alaska, one 
(Area 2B) off British Columbia, and one (Area 2A) off the U.S. Pacific Northwest. It does so by setting 
overall catch limits on retained and discarded catch and apportioning those limits among the ten 
regulatory Areas. Within Alaska, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) is responsible 
for developing and amending Fishery Management Plans (FMPs), including catch allocations of the 
overall catch limits set by the IPHC among the various fishing sectors. The principle sectors are 
commercial harvests in the halibut fishery, incidental catch in other commercial fisheries, non-guided 
sport fisheries, guided (charter) sport fisheries and subsistence fisheries. The Magnusen-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) of 1976 is the primary law governing marine fisheries 
management in U.S. federal waters. The Act includes National Standards that must be followed in any 
FMP set forth by the NPFMC to ensure sustainable and responsible fishery management. Importantly, 
national standard 1 requires an end to overfishing. The NPFMC is advisory to the Secretary of Commerce 
who delegates authority to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to review and implement 
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regulatory amendments proposed by the NPFMC. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the 
U.S. Coast Guard, and the State of Alaska provide enforcement of catch limits and fishing regulations (83 
FR 47819).
Historically, charter and unguided sport fisheries for halibut in Alaska were subject to uniform 
regulations. In International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) regulatory Areas (Figure 1), halibut 
fishing was closed in the winter and open typically, from March 1- October 31. During the open season, 
anglers were subject to a 2-fish daily bag limit, a 4-fish possession limit, but no annual limit on total 
retained catch (Mecum and Muse 2007). However, there was significant growth1 in Alaska's halibut sport 
fishery in the late 1990s and 2000s. During this time, there were no restrictions the number of boats 
allowed to offer halibut sport fishing charters. Consequently, the number of charter boats and the amount 
of halibut caught aboard charter boats increased greatly. The sport sector regularly exceeded the amount 
of catch that had been set aside for its use. Halibut catch within the commercial sector also exceeded 
allowed levels in the 1980's and 1990's2. The outcome was that together with bycatch (which was 
monitored and held below its allocation) the overall catch and discard mortality off Alaska threatened to 
exceed the limit set by the IPHC. The NPFMC was impelled to guard against this outcome to maintain 
compliancy with MSFCMA and national standard 1 requiring an end to overfishing. Conservation and 
management efforts taken to end overfishing in sport and commercial fisheries around the world set 
precedents for regulatory actions adopted to end overfishing and allocations disputes in Alaska's halibut 
fishery.
1 Between 1970 and the end of the 1990s the number of resident sport fish license sold increased 41% per year and non-resident 
sport fish licenses sales increased by 480% (Criddle, Herrmann, Lee and Hamel 2003).
2 Catch within the commercial sector has stayed under its limits ever since IFQs were implemented in 1995.
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Figure 1. International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) regulatory areas off Alaska
(retrieved from https://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/maps)
Beginning in the early 1970s limited entry programs were introduced in world fisheries as a 
means to slow the race-for-fish, to reduce the chance of overharvesting fish stocks, and to preserve 
economic value for fishermen (Bishop 1973). However, by the late 1970s, it was increasingly apparent 
that limited entry often failed to deliver on those management, biological, and economic objectives 
(Wilen 1988). Economic theory supported the need to stint the use of common pool resources (Demsetz 
1967, Anderson and Hill 1975, Castle 1978). The application of exclusive-use rights to shares of natural 
resource surplus production or share of recreation services based on public resources became increasingly 
common in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Moloney and Pearse 1979, Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982, 
Livengood 1983, Lueck 1989). The economic consequences of not controlling overcapacity in fisheries 
could be observed as fishery managers were unable to control fishing effort and harvests.
An assessment of limited entry programs showed that while managers could bind some of the 
elements of the fisheries production function, eg., boat numbers and size, gear dimensions, etc., fishermen 
have the capacity to modify other elements of their production function, including the intensity of their 
labor, their mobility and knowledge, or through gear and vessel modifications unconstrained by 
regulation (Pearse and Wilen 1979, Rettig 1984, Stollery 1986, Wilen 1988). The extent to which fishery 
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managers could combat fishing effort by controlling a single input through limited entry programs did 
nothing to alter the incentives among fishermen who then substituted unrestricted inputs to maintain a 
race for fish and further dissipation of resource rents (Wilen 1988, Dupont 1991, Criddle 2004). The 
economic shortcomings of limited entry programs soon led to the development of quota allocation 
systems in commercial fisheries (Moloney and Pearce 1979, Dewees 1989, Terry 1993, Gauvin et al 
1994, Wang 1995, Squires et al. 1995). Abundant evidence suggests that individual quotas (Casey et al. 
1995, Herrmann 1996, Weninger 1998, Herrmann 2000, Herrmann and Criddle 2006, Costello et al. 
2008, Brinson and Thunberg 2016, Melnychuk et al. 2016, Warpinski et al. 2016) and divisible sector 
allocations (Felthoven 2002, Morrison-Paul et al. 2009, Strong and Criddle 2014) in commercial fisheries 
have reduced costs and increased revenue to fishermen. Alaska's commercial fishery for halibut 
transitioned to individual fishing quota (IFQ) management in 1995 (NPFMC 1992, NPFMC 2016). This 
process has been observed in Alaska's halibut fishery where limited entry into the charter halibut fishery 
was implemented and followed by further regulatory measures to control output. Isolated management 
measures have generally been unsuccessful and the idea of complementing the various types of 
management measures with other measures; i.e., input, output, and rights-based, may prove to be more 
effective (OECD 1997).
Like commercial fisheries, sport fisheries are subject to congestion externalities and potential to 
exceed sustainable harvest levels. Traditional management measures for sport fisheries include season 
closures, gear restrictions, size limits, daily bag and possession limits, and annual catch limits. In 
addition, sport fisheries may be controlled through indirect measures such as access restrictions or fees 
charged by those who own land that abuts prime sport fishing habitat. Regulations for non-resident 
anglers are often more restrictive than regulations for resident anglers and regulations for charter anglers 
are generally more restrictive than regulations for unguided anglers. Recently there has been theoretical 
and practical interest in the application of limited entry (Cox et al. 2002, Johnston et al. 2007) and 
individual quota (Abbott et al. 2009, Abbott and Wilen 2009, Borch 2010) or group quota (Sutinen and 
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Johnston 2003) programs to sport fisheries. Efforts to design market-based solutions for sport fisheries 
draw on parallels with markets for hunting permits (Livengood 1983, Little and Berrens 2008).
To contend with the previously open-ended allocation of commercial halibut fishing quotas to the 
recreational fishery, Guideline Harvest Levels (GHL's) were assigned to the recreational halibut fishery 
in 2003, reflecting halibut abundance at this time, for areas 2C and 3A (67 FR 3867) where the largest 
commercial and recreational halibut harvests occur3. Together, Areas 2C and 3A encompass the entire 
southcentral and southeast coastlines of Alaska (Figure 1).
3 In 2012, Areas 2C and 3A accounted for 65% of total commercial landings and 99% of the recreational catch of 
halibut (Gilroy 2016).
By weight, the GHLs would equate to 13.05 percent of the combined guided recreational
and commercial quota in area 2C or 1,432,000 lb (649.5 mt) net weight; and 14.11
percent of the combined guided recreational and commercial quota in area 3A or 
3,650,000 lb (1,655.6 mt) net weight (67 FR 3867).
The GHL's identified the target harvest limits for the charter fishery (67 FR 3867). The assigned 
poundages fluctuate in response to fluctuation in halibut abundances. In addition to these management 
measures, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) Sport Fish Division implemented a 
Saltwater Charter Vessel Logbook requirement in 1998. Logbooks collect information on:
.. .the number of fish landed and/or released, the date and primary location of fishing, the
hours and number of lines fished, the number of clients and crew fishing, the ownership
of the vessel, and the identity of the vessel operator (67 FR 3867).
This information contributes to the determination of total annual halibut harvests by the charter fishing 
sector, stock abundances in given regulatory areas, fishing pressures in regulatory areas, and lends itself 
to the determination of GHL's and allocations to the various fishing sectors.
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While the GHL's were intended to control halibut harvests by the recreational fishery, in area 2C 
actual harvests exceeded the GHL every year from 2004-2010 and in Area 3A, halibut harvest met or 
exceeded its GHL in 2004-2007 and in 2007-2009. To cut down on these overages in Area 3A, NMFS 
used emergency orders to restrict halibut harvests by charter vessel skippers and crew (78 FR 75843). The 
GHL was therefore not effective at controlling the halibut harvest/output levels in the charter fishery. Its 
major disadvantages are understood as having been “not responsive or adaptable to changes in halibut 
abundance and fishing effort” (78 FR 75843).
Beginning in 2011, the NPFMC implemented a limited entry program for commercial businesses 
that offer halibut sport fishing trips, the Charter Halibut Limited Access Program (CHLAP; 82 FR 
12730). Under this program, vessels offering halibut sport fishing charter services must have a Charter 
Halibut Permit (CHP) (Yamada 2014; 82 FR 12730). The number of CHP's was limited to reflect 
historical participation, although additional permits can be issued to non-profit Community Quota Entities 
incorporated to promote economic development of small communities in Southeast Alaska and along the 
Gulf Coast of Alaska. CHP's are revocable use rights for a specific regulatory area. They are infinitely 
durable and transferable but include limits on the number of anglers allowed aboard to fish for and retain 
halibut. Commercial provisioning of recreation services involving public resources is common; consider 
guide-use permits, guide permits for white-water rafting, guide permits for hiking and horseback trips on 
public lands, etc. In a sense, CHP's, along with permitting processes observed for other public resources 
act as an assigned property right characterized by exclusivity, transferability, and enforceability. 
However, rights-based management as it pertains to fisheries is costly to create, monitor and enforce 
when there are numerous rights-holders (Criddle 2004).
The CHALP suffered from the familiar limitations observed in commercial limited entry 
programs: the presence of latent capacity on vessels issued CHP's allowed continued increases in the 
number of angler days offered by halibut charter operators. Those increases resulted in ongoing 
overharvest of the GHL despite additional restrictions onboard halibut charters.
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In 2014 the GHL was replaced by the Catch Sharing Plan (CSP; 78 FR 75844). The CSP outlined 
a total allowable halibut catch (TAC) and separately assigned fixed percentages of this TAC to the charter 
fishery and the commercial fishery. These percentages are designated as quota shares (QS). The TAC and 
the fixed percentages assigned to each fishing sector would vary according to the IPHC annual halibut 
abundances estimate. Allocation of harvest quotas are determined annually and with respect to halibut 
abundances and historical halibut catches in each fishery and ideally result in an equitable distribution. 
Commercial catch limits are directly monitored and enforced as annual poundage limits applied at the 
individual vessel level. This is possible because the commercial fishery has, since, 1995, operated under a 
system of IFQs with monitoring of all landings and a sample of fishing trips. The individual quotas are 
derived as shares of the commercial fishing allocation. Fishery managers strive to control the total 
poundage of retained sport fishing catches through various combinations of: daily bag and possession 
limits (e.g., 1 or 2 per day, 4 in possession); annual bag limits (e.g., a 4-fish annual limit for charter 
angler's in Area 3A); gear restrictions (e.g., single rod with a single hook); minimum, maximum, or slot 
size limits; etc. Regulations on charter anglers, have become more stringent as halibut abundance has 
dropped, and charter catch limits have been reduced (83 FR 47819).
Current regulations (84 FR 3403) on halibut charter anglers are:
• In Area 2C (Southeast Alaska): Sport fishers aboard sport fishing charter vessels are subject to a 
one fish daily bag limit, with a reverse slot limit that allows retention of halibut less than 38 
inches, or greater than 80 inches; there is no annual limit for halibut in Area 2C.
• In Area 3A (Central Gulf of Alaska): Sport fishers aboard sport fishing charter vessels are subject 
to a two fish daily bag limit, with a maximum size limit of less than or equal to 28 inches on one 
of those halibut, and a four fish annual limit. In addition, sport fishing charter operators in Area 
3A are not allowed to fish for halibut on Wednesdays throughout the season, or on six Tuesdays 
(four in July and two in August). In addition, sport fishing charter vessels and charter permit 
holders are limited to no more than one trip per day.
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Competition for a fixed number of halibut shares creates conflict between user groups. Further 
reductions or restrictions applied to either user group or TAC places an increasingly burdensome 
challenge on fishery managers to provide for the needs of the users and the resource. A developing 
economic approach to fisheries management suggests shifting the responsibility from the fishery 
managers to the market (Sutinen and Johnston 2003, Criddle 2004, Abbott et al. 2009, Borch 2010, 
Abbott and Willerd 2017). Perhaps the market is better equipped to self-correct from the multitude of 
biological or economic changes that can render an optimal allocation sub-optimal at any moment in time. 
The sheer variability in the proposed optimal allocation as well as the number of variables influencing 
optimality prompted a more market-based mechanism of transferable shares between the contesting users.
The charter halibut fishery currently has one way to provide additional harvest opportunities to their 
clients through participation in the Guided Angler Fish (GAF) program (78 FR 75843). GAF offers CHP 
holders in IPHC Areas 2C or 3A the opportunity to lease a limited amount of IFQ from commercial quota 
shareholders to allow charter clients to harvest halibut in addition to, or instead of, the halibut harvested 
under the daily bag limit for charter anglers (Iverson, 2018, Kroetz et al. 2019).
Charter operators have expressed an interest in finding a market-based mechanism to help increase or 
supplement the amount of halibut allocated to the charter sector under the existing Catch Share Plan. The 
NPFMC responded by proposing a Recreational Quota Entity (RQE) program 82 FR 46016. The RQE's 
are similar to the Angling Management Organizations suggested in Sutinen and Johnston (2003). The 
RQE program is intended to provide additional harvest opportunities and less restrictive annual harvest 
measures for charter anglers in times of low halibut abundance (82 FR 46016). The final rule for the RQE 
program was published in the Federal Register on 21 September 2018 (83 FR 47819). This final rule 
allows the formation of a RQE, a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, to purchase commercial halibut QS. 
The harvest pounds associated with the purchased QS would yield annual Recreational Fishing Quota, 
supplementing the amount of halibut allocated to the charter sector under the existing CSP. If the RQE 
were to acquire enough QS, the halibut size and bag limits for charter anglers could be relaxed to the 
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current daily bag limit for unguided halibut anglers; the retention of two fish of any size as a daily bag 
limit (82 FR 46016.) Attempts at increasing the supply of recreational goods are a common private and or 
public undertaking. For example, there are private, state, and federal sport fish hatcheries programs to 
supplement sportfish stocks.
The mechanisms for funding the RQE acquisition of commercial halibut QS have not yet been 
determined. One possible funding mechanism is to require that anglers purchase a state-endorsed halibut 
stamp. Other potential funding mechanisms include a federal halibut stamp, a tax on charter halibut trips, 
an annual fee on CHP's, public or private funds, government or non-government grants, or a surcharge of 
sport fishing licenses (Yamada and Flumerfelt 2014). The Dingell-Johnson Sport Fish Restoration Act, 
which authorizes federal financial assistance for state fish restoration and management plans and projects, 
such as stock enhancement, habitat improvement, and public access, might be another source of funding 
for RQE purchases of halibut QS. While there is some private provision of sport fishing opportunities, 
e.g., private fishing ponds, most sport fishing opportunities are reliant on natural aquatic systems. Similar 
public goods, such as parks, preserves, and refuges are typically financed with public funds or through 
contributions from private organizations (e.g., Safari Club International, Ducks' unlimited, The Nature 
Conservancy).Where commercial activities compete with recreation activities, increases in resources 
allocated to recreation can also be increased through the attenuation of commercial use rights (e.g., 
revocation of timber and water rights, reallocation of fishing rights, reductions or restrictions in Exclusive 
Guide Areas (EGA's), or hunting concession permits). While there are a number of possible funding 
mechanisms to fund QS purchases to support the RQE program, this paper focuses on one mechanism, 
angler WTP for a state-endorsed halibut stamp.
3. Literature Review
The commercial and recreational fishing sectors satisfy two distinct but competing market 
demands. While recreational fishermen may in part demand fish for consumptive purposes, the 
overwhelming demand observed in the sport fishery is recreation (Green 1991). In contrast, while the 
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commercial fishermen speak of the importance of lifestyle, the principal role of the commercial fishery is 
to supply fish for consumption. In the presence of competing demands for scarce goods and services, 
economic benefits are maximized when resources are reallocated among sectors until the marginal net 
benefit of the resource is equal across sectors (Bishop and Samples 1980). Within each fishing sector, 
competition arises for the use of limited fish resources and intensifies when total harvest must be 
decreased, or the rate of increase must be reduced. Inevitably, sustainability by “ensuring the expected 
flows of use, option, and nonuse benefits provided by the fishery are not degraded through time” (Criddle 
2004), becomes a principle concern in fisheries management. Achieving an optimum sustainable outcome 
requires thorough understanding of the economic composition of the utility functions associated with 
commercial and sport fishing as well as comprehensive understanding of the biological and ecological 
systems that govern the production of the goods and services valued by society. Because the demand for 
and supply of fishery-related goods and services shifts in response to changes in input and output factor 
prices, shifts in tastes and preferences, changes in technology, and changes in the productivity and 
carrying capacity of the natural system, the fortuitous circumstances under which an optimal allocation is 
achieved will not last. Consequently, without a mechanism to reallocate the resource in response to those 
changes, every optimal allocation will soon become suboptimal. A central planner would be hard pressed 
to keep up with the myriad of changes in demand and supply of fishery dependent commercial and 
recreation goods and services and central planning often leads to economically wasteful rent-seeking. 
Under well-known conditions, market-based allocations are self-correcting and, consequently, outperform 
allocations through central planning. However, markets for public goods can fail in the presence of 
externalities, market concentration, and information asymmetry, conditions that are often present in 
fisheries. To what degree and for the appropriate way to manage such resources, we look to decades of 
economic study and historical outcomes resulting from management strategies or lack thereof.
More often than not we have observed allocation of fish resources by user group under the 
consideration of their “values;” the gross benefits observed from the recreational fishery and the dockside 
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value of commercial landings. The derivation of these values has relied on various economic 
methodologies such as input-output analysis and cost-benefit analysis and investigation into the use of 
each method suggests that neither is equipped at determining the optimal allocation of a fishery resource 
(Edwards 1990). For example, input-output analysis assumes that prices are fixed and does not allow for 
substitution between factors (Lew and Seung 2010); of which recreational fishing and consumption of 
fish resources have many substitutes. Bishop and Samples (1980) identify a number of issues stemming 
from this method of allocation such as the inadequate calculation of costs, a measurement of average 
benefits as opposed to marginal benefits, the assignment of total allowable catch (TAC) based on the 
inability to model the relationship between sport and commercial catches given changes in stock 
abundances (Bishop and Samples 1980). The problem of adequately accounting for costs in determining 
the socially optimal allocation between the two fishing sectors has been explored, and problems arise in 
comparing and contrasting the most economical or optimal allocation of a fish resource across these two 
very heterogeneous user groups based on the costs they incur. This is true in comparing the value of 
recreational fishing with commercial fishing, where the currency value is over-emphasized because 
recreational fishing is largely motivated by non-catch utility (McPhee and Hundloe 2004). When 
comparing benefits or costs it is important to consider not only primary markets, such as ex-vessel sales 
of commercial catches, but also secondary markets such as processors, charter operators, lodges, etc., that 
depend on primary markets and generate additional consumer and producer surpluses (Edwards 1990, 
Easley 1992). Sutinen (1993) models allocations between commercial and recreational fishing sectors 
under the assumptions that enforcement costs differ between user groups and that compliance is 
imperfect. Models show an increased bag limit in the sport fishery can have the unintended consequence 
of creating the perception of improved benefits to both violators and complying anglers to the regulations 
placed on the resource. Improving the allocation to this user group in Sutinen's (1993) model would be 
expected to increase the number of anglers participating in this fishery as well as potentially increasing 
the number of trips by both regulation violators and compliers; consequently, an increase in the bag limit 
could increase aggregate catch. This notion is supported again when fishery managers regulate fishing 
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sectors independent of one another but with the common goal of improving or sustaining fish stocks. The 
successful management of fishing efforts in one sector results in benefits attainable by the other sector 
which often further encourages fishing efforts by both sectors ( McConnell and Sutinen 1979). Several 
models are presented and provide that enforcement costs and imperfect regulatory compliance are 
important factors in determining the optimal catch allocations as well as suggest that the optimal 
allocation assignment may be to the fishing sector having the higher marginal enforcement costs (Sutinen 
1993).
Attainable net benefits in any fishery depend on fish population levels, the mix of commercial 
and recreational goods and services associated with the fish population level, choices of how to divide 
product capacity of the fishery among competing sectors, harvest control rules and allocation mechanisms 
within each sector, and the costs of management and enforcement . For the most part, fisheries around the 
world are fully allocated. Consequently, allocations between fishing sectors generally entail amending 
existing allocations and their associated regulations rather than developing an optimal allocation of a 
hitherto unexploited resource. For example, in implementing a new policy, such as the RQE program, 
managers must contend with the failures of the status quo. Amending the status quo in favor of one sector 
will adversely affect its rival and thereby create resistance to changes even if that change will result in an 
overall welfare improvement (Easley 1992). It should also be noted that a review of case studies 
pertaining to various allocation of access into Australia's fisheries to improve overall net benefits failed to 
consider that the change in allocation could result in merely a regional redistribution of economic benefits 
(McPhee and Hundloe 2004).
In situations where biological and economical demands require harvest to be reduced or for 
allocations to be reassigned the ability to maximize welfare occurs when the marginal net benefits are 
equated across the user groups (Bishop and Samples 1980). This notion of maximizing welfare through 
an allocation decision that equates marginal net benefits across user groups has become a strongly 
supported economic theory (Mcphee and Hundloe 2004, Easley and Prochaska 1987). The rippling effects 
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of initial catch allocations, reduced, improved or reassigned allocations can be significant. A number of 
dynamic factors that influence the marginal net benefits of a commercial and sport fishery make it nearly 
impossible for central planning to capture the optimal allocation based on the highest gain in marginal net 
benefits by user group. Nearly every possible allocation assignment would be sub-optimal because the 
ability to capture and to model the effects and implications of one allocation only holds optimal with the 
assumption of ceteris paribus. The possible interaction effects of any fisheries management decisions are 
without limit and not constrained to the user groups but to the resource as well. Fisheries are complex 
ecological systems with a unique and self-supported food chain. Fisheries management decisions for one 
species will inevitably affect that species prey and or predator as well (Bishop and Samples 1980).
Fisheries managers face many constraints under which they are required to make decisions to 
sustain fish resources and the industries they support. They are restricted by available data, stock 
assessments, research methodologies, funding for further analysis or enforcement of regulation, etc. 
(Edwards 1990). As discussed previously, fishery managers are almost certain to fail at optimally 
allocating fish resources; the question is whether a market structure can be developed to more optimally 
allocate fish resources. Markets respond to relative changes in values and in theory, under particular 
management design providing users the ability to reallocate resources to their most economical use, and 
can self-correct under the influence of its many dynamic factors.
4. Empirical Model
A payment card method was applied in our survey and used to collect WTP interval data.
Procedures for maximum likelihood estimation of the “payment card” regression model are followed 
(Cameron and Huppert 1989). Respondent WTP, Equation (1), is assumed to be non-negative and to 
follow a linear function where WTPi is the WTP of respondent i. The intercept of this equation, a is an 
unknown constant to be estimated. The disturbance, εi, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
zero and standard deviation σ. The coefficient,β, is an unknown value to be estimated. The matrix 
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Applying the maximum likelihood method when estimating Equation (4) allows for the 
examination of how explanatory variables influence in determining WTP.
5. Data
A web-based survey was conducted over two months, December 2018 and January 2019. The 
survey presented information about the newly adopted RQE program in Alaska's charter halibut fishery 
and inquired about anglers WTP to support the RQE program under current and liberalized catch
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consists of explanatory variables acting as determinants of each respondent's WTP for a state-endorsed 
halibut stamp:
The respondent's true WTPi is known to lie within an interval. Equation (2) accounts for this by 
standardizing the lower and upper bounds of this interval with tli and tui, where zi is the standard normal 
variable:
The probability function expressed in Equation (2) can be rewritten as the difference between two 
standard normal cumulative distribution functions. In Equation (3), zui and zli represent the lower and 
upper bounds in Equation (2) and for, any given observation, this can be written as Φ(zui) - Φ(zli), 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal density function:
The joint probability density function for n individual observations can be expressed as a log-
likelihood function defined over the unknown parameters α, β, and σ. The log-likelihood function is 
given as:
regulations for charter anglers. The survey was designed and implemented using Qualtrics professional 
survey software. Respondents were initially solicited for their voluntary participation via a postcard 
mailing which provided a QR code and URL link for access to the online survey. A pilot survey was 
administered in November 2018 to 200 individuals who held an Alaska sport fish license in 2017. Based 
on comments and suggestions received on the pilot survey, adjustments were made to the survey 
instrument version to improve clarity.
The survey sample was randomly drawn from a publicly available license holder database of 
individuals who held an Alaska sport fishing license in 2017. Because the database did not include 
information about license holder's fishing history, it was not possible to screen for individuals who had 
participated in Alaska's halibut sport fishery. Consequently, the survey sample included many license 
holders who had not participated in the halibut sport fishery4. The survey was mailed in December 2018 
and delivered to a stratified random sample of 10,021 individuals who held an Alaska sport fishing 
license in 2017; the sample was stratified to include 5,017 resident anglers and 5,004 non-resident 
anglers. A ‘Survey Reminder' postcard was mailed to a stratified random sample of 2,000 non­
respondents in January 2019. Responses were received from 503 license holders. Survey responses with 
significant item non-response (i.e., failed to include responses to the CVM question or were missing 
responses to all the socio-demographics questions) were omitted from the data to be used to estimate 
model parameters; this left 414 responses. Some of these 414 responses were incomplete for some of the 
socio-demographic questions. A mean imputation method was used to replace those missing values5 and 
the final data set was cross-validated with statistics reported in the NOAA report on Demographics of 
Recreational Fishing in Alaska (Little and Sepez 2003, Patrician 2002, Samnaliev et al. 2003). We feel 
4 Evaluation of the pilot survey yielded a total angler response rate of 6.5%. Of this 6.5%, 92% of respondents indicated a history of participating 
in Alaska's halibut sport fishery in either 2017 or 2018.
5 A total of 29 values were imputed for missing data on respondents Age, 17 values were imputed for Household Income, 3 values were imputed 
for Household size, 3 values were imputed for Employment status, 1 value was imputed for Gender, 1 value was imputed for Trip Planner, and 1 
value was imputed for Education level
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confident that imputed values closely reflect the demographics of anglers who sport fish in Alaska. A 
majority of the respondents (310 of 414) indicated that they had participated in Alaska's halibut sport 
fishery in 2017.
The survey captured a broad cross-section of anglers in that responses were obtained from 
residents of 36 states besides Alaska. A total of 150 responses were from Alaska residents. Variables used 
in the empirical models directly relate to the responses elicited in the survey based on fishing avidity and 
socio-demographics. Table 1 provides these variable definitions and statistical descriptions while 
summarizing the sociodemographic characteristics of the sample as a whole. As shown in Table 1, 
70.77% of the respondents were male, the average age of respondents was 53, and 344 (83%) of the 
respondents indicated that they were responsible for planning their household's fishing trips.
Table 1. Variable Definition and Statistical Description (n=414)
Variable Description Mean S.D.
Total_daysfish_1718 Respondents total days fishing for any species in Alaska during 2017 and 
2018, combined
20.08 43.27
Halibutfish Dummy variable: 0 if the respondent did not fish for halibut in 2017 or 2018, 1 
if the respondent did fish for halibut in 2017 or 2018
0.73 0.44
Area2C2017 Respondents total days halibut fishing in Alaska in area 2C, 2017 1.82 10.20
Area3A 2017 Respondents total days halibut fishing in Alaska in area 3A, 2017 1.73 5.74
Area2C_2018 Respondents total days halibut fishing in Alaska in area 2C, 2018 1.79 12.25
Area3A 2018 Respondents total days halibut fishing in Alaska in area 3A, 2018 1.35 6.84
Charterfish Dummy variable: 1 if the respondent charter halibut fished in Alaska in 2017 or 
2018, 0 if the respondent did not charter halibut fish in Alaska in 2017 or 2018
0.47 0.50
Gender Dummy variable: 0 for male, 1 for female 0.29 0.46
Age Respondent's age 53.51 13.53
Residency Dummy variable: 0 for State of Alaska resident, 1 for non-resident of Alaska 0.64 0.48
Education The highest level of education completed by the respondents:
1 = some high school, 2 = high school diploma, 3 = some college, 4 = 
Associates degree, 5 = Bachelor's degree, 6 = Master's degree, 7 = Ph.D.
4.44 1.44
Employment Respondents employment status:
1 = Unemployed, 2 = Part-time, 3 = Full-time, 4 = Retired
3.17 0.71
HHincome Household's annual income level of respondents:
1 = $0-24,999, 2 = $25,000-49,999, 3 = $50,000-74,999, 4 = $75,000-99,999, 
5 ≥ 100,000
4.03 1.14
HHsize Size of respondents household. 1 if the respondent lives alone. 2.60 1.31
Trip Planner Dummy Variable: 0 if the respondent is responsible for planning the fishing 
trips in their household, 1 if the respondent is not responsible for planning the 
fishing trips in their household.
0.29 0.46
Version A Dummy Variable: 0 if the respondent completed survey Version A, 1 if the 
respondent completed survey Version B
0.52 0.50
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The mean annual household income was reported to be between $75,000 and $99,999 and 90.34% of 
respondents had varying levels of college education, with the largest concentration (35.75%) holding 
four-year bachelor degrees. In addition, the average household size coefficient was 2.59 indicating 
household size of 2-3 persons, and 64.49 % of respondents were employed while 31.16% were retired. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics and socio-demographic characteristics by survey version.
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Survey Version
Angler Characteristic Mean
Version A
Median SD Mean
Version B
Median SD
Average days fished in 2017 13.81 5 28.35 8.99 5 17.05
Average days fished in 2018 11.09 3 25.61 5.98 2 13.30
Proportion having halibut fished 0.79 1 0.41 0.68 1 0.47
Proportion having charter halibut fished 0.41 0 0.49 0.54 1 .050
Proportion female 0.31 0 0.47 0.27 0 0.44
Age (years) 53 53 13.52 54 56 13.54
Proportion non-resident 0.61 1 0.49 0.67 1 0.47
Education 4.39 5 1.50 4.50 5 1.36
Employment 3.15 3 0.73 3.19 3 0.70
Household income 3.95 4 1.19 4.1 4 1.07
Household size (by number of persons) 2.66 2 1.29 2.53 2 1.33
Version A (n=213) Version B (n=201) *Categorical variables not indicated as proportions correspond to statistical descriptions outlined in Table1
At the beginning of the survey, respondents were provided with a brief description of how
Alaska's halibut fishery is managed (Section 1) followed by background information on the RQE 
program- what it is and what it is intended to do (Section 2). In section 3, respondents were prompted to 
provide information concerning their angling activity in Alaska over two years, 2017 and 2018. Section 4 
of the survey contained the valuation question. The valuation question asked anglers WTP for an annual 
state-endorsed halibut stamp if it were required for halibut fishing in Alaska. Respondents were told to 
assume that revenues from stamp sales would be dedicated to purchasing commercial QS for the RQE 
program to help relax the regulations for charter halibut anglers. Both versions of the CV question were 
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framed with an introductory question asking respondents the strength of their agreement with the 
following statement, “I am willing to pay for less restrictive charter halibut fishing regulations in Alaska.” 
This question was followed by a note outlying the existing price of a sport fishing license in Alaska and a 
statement that stamp fees would be paid in addition to the sport fishing license fee and that receipts from 
stamp purchases would be dedicated to the RQE program. Both versions of the survey asked respondents 
to:
Please check the box corresponding to the greatest amount you would be willing
to pay for an annual halibut stamp so that you would be able to halibut fish on your next
fishing trip in Alaska (see supplemental file for survey instrument).
The two versions of the survey differed from one another in that, Version A of the WTP question 
explicitly stated and graphically showed no change in the current guided halibut fishing regulations and 
stated no change in the unguided halibut fishing regulations; that is, the status quo was maintained for 
halibut fishing but the proceeds from the purchase of the halibut stamp would be dedicated to the RQE 
program to help loosen the regulations for charter halibut anglers in the future. Version B explicitly stated 
and graphically showed less restrictive guided halibut fishing regulations allowing charter fishermen to 
catch their daily bag limit with fish of any size and also stated no change in the unguided halibut fishing 
regulations; that is, the RQE program is presented as having already relaxed management measures and 
that proceeds from stamp purchases would continue to be dedicated to the RQE program. The ranges of 
halibut stamp prices respondents were asked to select from were: $0, $10, $20, $30, $40, $50, $60, $70, 
$80, $90, and >$100. The indicated response was presumed to represent the upper bound of their WTP, 
the next lowest bid option was presumed to represent the lower bound of their WTP and it was assumed 
that their true WTP exists within the intervals between the upper and lower bounds6. The payment card 
6 Models were estimated using the upper interval as well and statistical significance of estimates remained unchanged
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interval choice frequencies for both Version A and Version B are provided in Table 3 and Table 4. Figure 
2 provides a histogram of bid values by survey version.
The certainty calibration method was applied to overcome issues of hypothetical bias. The WTP 
question was followed by a question asking respondents how confident they are with the value they 
indicated in the valuation question (Gate 2010). The responses to the confidence question were recorded 
on a 4-point scale ranging from “extremely confident” to “not at all confident.
Interval Raw Frequency (%) Cum.
$0-10 63 (33.16) 40.53
$10-20 65 (34.21) 67.37
$20-30 20 (10.53) 77.89
$30-40 14 (7.37) 85.26
$40-50 16 (8.42) 93.68
$50-60 2 (1.05) 94.74
$60-70 2 (1.05) 95.79
$70-80 0 0
$80-90 0 0
$90-100 8 (4.21) 100.00
Interval Raw Frequency (%) Cum.
$0-10 56 (32.00) 38.86
$10-20 52 (29.71) 61.71
$20-30 19 (10.86) 72.57
$30-40 12 (6.86) 79.43
$40-50 21 (12.00) 91.43
$50-60 3 (1.71) 93.14
$60-70 2 (1.14) 94.29
$70-80 1 (.57) 94.86
$80-90 1 (.57) 95.43
$90-100 8 (4.57) 100.00
As in Table 3, bid intervals for payment card responses reported on Table 4 excludes true $0 bids. 
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Table 3. Version A (no change in charter halibut regulations) Interval Selection Frequencies (n=190)
All respondents were also asked: “How confident are you that this value reflects the maximum amount you would be willing to 
pay for a halibut stamp allowing you to fish for halibut under the current halibut fishing regulations?” If a respondent indicated a 
$0 bid as well as replied “Extremely confident”, we consider their true WTP to be $0. True $0 bids are not included in the Table 
3.
Table 4. Version B (relaxation of charter halibut regulations) Interval Selection Frequencies (n=175)
True “zeros” were detected and omitted from WTP analysis. Finally, in the last section of the survey,
respondents were asked to answer questions about their socio-demographic characteristics. This 
information was used to ensure that the survey reached a broad cross-section of society and in 
investigating various determinants in WTP.
Figure 2. Histogram of Bid Densities by Survey Version
6. Results
6.1 Descriptive Analysis
As expected, both versions of the model results found a statistically significant inverse 
relationship between WTP and the percentage of bids. As the bid interval increases, bid frequencies 
decrease. Estimates of WTP based on the two CV versions are similar. For both survey versions, median 
WTP is $20. Mean WTP for Version A was $25.32, while mean WTP for Version B was $27.83. A 
Wilcoxen rank-sum test shows that differences across WTP distributions by survey version are not 
statistically significant.
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6.2 Determinants of WTP Amounts
Coefficient estimates for variables affecting WTP are presented in Table 5. The coefficients can 
be interpreted as changes in the marginal WTP for incremental changes in the value of the corresponding 
variable. Model results presented in Table 5 include estimates of coefficients associated with variables 
related to fishing experience for six combinations of CV question version and model specification. 
Candidate models were selected based on post-estimation results of best fit and to show that inference of 
the data has minimal variance under various model specifications to support findings presented in the 
conclusion. Models 1A and 1B include the variable of total days fished in 2017 and 2018 for survey 
Version A and survey Version B. In contrast, while models 2A and 2B also estimate alternative 
specifications for survey Version A and Version B, they differ from models 1A and 1B by including a 
variable representing the respondent's participation in the charter halibut fishery. Models 3A and 3B 
differentiate by these same variables, but over the pooled data set, that is responses from both Version A 
and Version B, and include the variable VersionA to assess the marginal differences between survey 
versions across the entire sample. The variable VersionA is not statistically significant which supports 
other findings that WTP for a state-endorsed halibut stamp is not contingent upon a regulation change; the 
true value is in preserving the option to halibut fish. With respect to the variable referring to anglers 
history of participating in Alaska's halibut sport fishery (represented by Halibutfish), it is not statistically 
significant in any of the estimated models; implying that anglers with a history of participating in 
Alaska's halibut sport fishery are no more willing to pay for a halibut stamp than all other anglers. 
Similarly, no statistical significance is found to affect WTP with anglers who indicated having charter 
fished for halibut in 2017 or 2018 (represented by Charterfish). In addition, the total days fished in 
Alaska in 2017 and 2018 is significant for respondents to the Version A question (Model 1A). The 
variable totaldaysfish_1718 represents respondents' fishing avidity by days spent sport fishing whereas, 
the variable Charterfish and Halibutfish are dummy variables representing participation in the respective 
fishing sectors. Statistical significance for WTP for a halibut sport fishing stamp observed for the variable 
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totaldaysfish_1718 (representing days fished in Alaska without species specification) in Model 1A and 
not for the variable Charterfish (representing charter halibut fishing) suggests that WTP is weighted more 
heavily towards the option to fish than to fish for specific species in the guided sector.
Angler employment is statistically significant at varying levels of significance,1%, 5%, and 10%, 
in each model given that the respondent indicated being full-time employed or retired from employment. 
Respondents indicating an education level of an associate's degree or a bachelor's degree is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in Model 3A and the 1% level in Model 3B.
The coefficients representing each respondent's confidence level in their stated WTP is grouped 
by those indicating being somewhat confident, and not very or not at all confident. The base group is 
comprised of respondents who indicated that they were extremely confident in their indicated WTP bid. 
Eight respondents indicated a ‘not at all' confidence level with their bid so this group was combined with 
the group of individuals indicating a not very confidence level. Coefficients for confidence levels are not 
found to be statistically significant in any of the models however, coefficients are negative for 
respondents indicating a not very or not at all confidence level in their bid selection. Similarly, positive 
coefficients are observed for somewhat confident respondents in Models 1B, 2B, 3A, and 3B. Results 
suggest that the detection of hypothetical bias is coordinated across survey versions and among the 
estimated Models. It is expected that confidence levels in support of one's bid estimates would bias their 
WTP upward and vice versa; the direct relationship observed here supports the use of the indicated WTP 
as the upper threshold of bid intervals used in estimating the models. Negative coefficients for somewhat 
confident respondents in their bid selection are observed in Models 1A and 2A which suggest that survey 
version; i.e., regulation change, has some influence in respondents WTP but not at a statistically 
significant level. Confidence levels were run as interaction terms with the variable Halibutfish, a binary 
variable indicating participation in the halibut fishery, to support the null-hypothesis that a respondent's 
confidence level along with their bid estimate is supported by their fishing practices. We fail to reject the 
null hypothesis, and conclude that confidence levels and bid estimates are indicative of a reiteration of 
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respondent's preferences either to or not to sport fish for halibut. The statistically small number of true 
zero bids (8 total) indicates that the data presented here is not subject to any serious protest behavior.
Table 5. Coefficient Estimates and P-values for Candidate Models of WTP
VARIABLES
(Model 1A)
Version A
(Model 1B)
Version B
(Model2A) 
Version A
(Model 2B)
Version B
(Model 3A)
Pooled
(Model3B) 
Pooled
Total_daysfish_1718 0.109** -0.00557 0.0696
(0.006) (0.909) (0.095)
Halibutfish 2.453 -2.928 -1.092
(0.591) (0.446) (0.708)
Version A -1.030 -1.097
(0.643) (0.619)
Charterfish 2.345 4.766 0.611 4.527 3.076 1.983
(0.393) (0.179) (0.825) (0.215) (0.183) (0.385)
Gender -2.350 1.494 -3.691 1.611 -0.660 -1.168
(0.491) (0.690) (0.297) (0.664) (0.784) (0.634)
Age -0.217 0.322 -0.232 0.320 0.0230 -0.00223
(0.114) (0.081) (0.109) (0.079) (0.842) (0.985)
Non-resident -0.0899 2.572 -0.111 3.075 2.290 2.793
(0.976) (0.443) (0.974) (0.360) (0.320) (0.253)
Education
High School Diploma 0.0222 11.89 0.278 12.94 11.02 8.692
(0.998) (0.395) (0.978) (0.361) (0.110) (0.205)
Some College 2.453 9.565 5.114 10.25 12.37* 10.36
(0.776) (0.448) (0.546) (0.415) (0.041) (0.086)
Associates Degree 6.658 20.56 10.53 21.44 19.04** 17.50*
(0.464) (0.136) (0.272) (0.120) (0.006) (0.013)
Bachelor's Degree 6.201 16.08 7.369 16.77 16.89** 14.12*
(0.470) (0.194) (0.376) (0.172) (0.006) (0.020)
Master's Degree 1.756 4.729 2.818 4.951 10.10 7.656
(0.850) (0.711) (0.755) (0.701) (0.117) (0.229)
Professional/ Ph.D. 9.182 6.178 10.24 7.699 14.81* 12.36
(0.408) (0.655) (0.351) (0.575) (0.047) (0.095)
Employment
Part-time 3.360 6.383 4.234 5.675 5.451 6.829
(0.555) (0.439) (0.365) (0.481) (0.300) (0.175)
Full-time 8.194 14.21* 8.631* 13.89* 10.48** 10.98***
(0.073) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000)
Retired 17.21** -0.199 17.53*** -0.261 9.121* 9.594*
(0.002) (0.974) (0.001) (0.965) (0.027) (0.017)
HHincome
$25,000-49,999 -0.840 11.00 1.805 10.54 1.350 3.148
(0.902) (0.468) (0.788) (0.467) (0.818) (0.603)
$50,000-74,999 -1.826 -3.964 1.613 -3.635 -1.253 0.393
(0.795) (0.651) (0.813) (0.669) (0.818) (0.942)
$75,000-99,999 -2.837 -12.00 -1.024 -12.45 -6.392 -5.180
(0.680) (0.156) (0.873) (0.127) (0.224) (0.313)
$100,000 or more 1.271 -10.97 2.888 -11.23 -2.520 -1.368
(0.856) (0.219) (0.655) (0.190) (0.629) (0.788)
HHsize -0.149 -0.0867 -0.163 -0.248 -0.361 -0.328
(0.896) (0.951) (0.888) (0.860) (0.679) (0.712)
Confidence
Somewhat confident -0.550 6.327 -2.177 6.332 3.031 2.170
(0.875) (0.074) (0.528) (0.069) (0.232) (0.388)
Not at all confident -4.921 -1.780 -4.796 -1.791 -2.387 -2.484
(0.400) (0.712) (0.415) (0.710) (0.534) (0.514)
Constant 17.09 -14.81 15.98 -12.95 -4.046 0.748
(0.276) (0.220) (0.324) (0.302) (0.670) (0.939)
lnsigma 2.962*** 3.026*** 2.995*** 3.024*** 3.035*** 3.044***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 190 175 190 175 365 365
P-values are in parenthesis. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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6.3 Assessment of Policy Preferences
Additional questions were presented to respondents of both survey versions to provide a more 
thorough understanding of angler preferences at the individual level and insight into their response to the 
valuation questions. After the valuation section in each survey version, respondents were prompted to 
select from a number of options helping to describe their anticipated plans about future halibut sport 
fishing trips in Alaska under the assumption that there would be a requirement to purchase a halibut 
stamp. The survey questions and corresponding response selections are shown below. Quantities in 
parenthesis represent the total number of respondents who selected that option. Respondents were allowed 
to check every option that applied to them. “Which of the following best describes your future halibut 
fishing decisions in Alaska if you were required to purchase a halibut stamp to fish for halibut in Alaska?”
• I do not and I will not fish for halibut. (29)
• I would start charter halibut fishing. (24)
• I would continue charter halibut fishing. (207)
• I would stop charter halibut fishing. (36)
• I would start halibut fishing (non-guided). (28)
• I would continue halibut fishing (non-guided). (127)
• I would stop halibut fishing (non-guided). (18)
• Other (40)
Information provided from this questions allowed for a more nuanced interpretation of WTP 
estimates as well as a comparison of future angling behavior by survey version. Table 6 presents the 
proportion of anglers by survey version who indicated each response. Notably, over 50% of the total 
respondents indicated that they would continue to take charter halibut sport fishing trips even if required 
to purchase a halibut stamp and nearly 31% indicated that they would continue to take non-guided halibut 
sport fishing trips.
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A second question asked the respondents to rank, from their most preferred to their least 
preferred, alternatives for regulating sport fishing catches of halibut. The catch regulations to be ranked 
were the four catch regulation methods used to manage the sport fish industry in Alaska. Table 7 
summarizes the responses. Daily bag limit, a restriction on the quantity of fish harvested daily, was most 
frequently selected as the most preferred catch regulation method. Restrictions on the days permitted to 
fish, either by season length or no-fishing days, was most frequently selected as respondents' least 
preferred catch regulation.
Table 6. Indicated Behavior Change, post valuation query
Response Option
Version A
(current regulations) n=211
Version B
(relaxed regulations) n=200
I do not and I will not fish for halibut 0.07 0.06
I would start charter halibut fishing 0.07 0.04
I would continue charter halibut fishing 0.44 0.57
I would stop charter halibut fishing 0.08 0.09
I would start halibut fishing (non-guided) 0.05 0.08
I would continue halibut fishing (non-guided) 0.33 0.28
I would stop halibut fishing (non-guided) 0.03 0.05
Other 0.11 0.08
Table 7. Preference Toward Various Catch Regulations
Catch Regulation
Version A
Most
preferred
(n=213)
Least
preferred
Version B
Most
preferred
(n=201)
Least 
preferred
Total
Most
preferred
(N=414)
Least
preferred
Daily bag limit
(restriction on the quantity of fish 
harvested daily)
104 (0.49) 23 (0.11) 103 (0.51) 23 (0.11) 207 (0.50) 46 (0.11)
Annual bag limit
(restriction on the quantity of fish 
harvested annually)
66 (0.31) 47 (0.22) 51 (0.25) 41 (0.20) 117 (0.28) 88 (0.21)
Size of fish
(minimum, maximum, or slot 
restrictions on fish length)
22 (0.10) 45 (0.21) 22 (0.11) 41 (0.20) 44 (0.11) 86 (0.21)
Days permitted to fish 21 (0.10) 98 (0.46) 25 (0.12) 96 (0.48) 46 (0.11) 194 (0.47)
(length of season/ no-fishing days)
Frequency of catch regulation being most preferred is shown first with by proportions in parenthesis.
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7. Conclusions
In this study, data collected from a web-based survey is used to estimate charter anglers' WTP to 
support the RQE program. A possible funding mechanism for the RQE is to require that anglers purchase 
a halibut stamp to participate in Alaska's halibut sport fishery. Revenues from stamp sales would be 
dedicated to the RQE to purchase commercial halibut QS and thereby increase the total allocation of 
halibut to the charter sector. The supplemental halibut to the charter allocation could help the charter 
sector accommodate continued increases in the demand for charter trips and might allow some relaxation 
of current charter halibut fishing regulations even in years of low halibut abundance, perhaps to a point 
where guided anglers could operate under the same limits applied to un-guided anglers: a 2-fish per day 
bag limit, a 4-fish possession limit, and no size limits. Two valuation questions were randomized across 
respondent samples to examine WTP under current charter halibut fishing regulations, and under more 
relaxed charter halibut fishing regulations made possible through revenues generated by halibut stamp 
sales. The actual level of regulatory relief that may be afforded by the RQE program is unknown and will 
depend on a number of factors, many of which are unrelated to the magnitude of revenues generated by 
halibut stamp sales. These exogenous factors include the effect of changes in the ocean environment and 
how those changes affect halibut size-at-age, abundance, and distribution, changes in market price of 
commercial halibut QS, changes in the demand for charter halibut sport fishing trips, and whether the 
IPHC will continue past practice of over-allocating Area 2 halibut to Area 2B (British Columbia). 
Moreover, the actual mechanisms for funding the RQE program have not yet been identified and might 
require additional regulatory action to be viable. If a regulatory change was made possible with 
consideration of other factors as well as through the receipt of stamp purchases, it is likely that regulation 
changes would not be immediate and would instead be implemented for future fishing seasons. Great 
consideration was given to these challenges in the survey design process and ultimately resolved in the 
design and randomization of two different valuation questions. WTP estimates from both survey versions 
were very similar with no difference in median WTP and mean WTP differing by only $2.51. Data
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collected on the socio-demographics and fishing experience were very similar across the two survey 
versions ruling out these factors as affecting the WTP values in each survey. The small variation observed 
in WTP estimates across survey versions and among resident and non-resident anglers as well as halibut 
and non-halibut anglers suggests that the anglers indicated value reflects their option value for halibut 
sport fishing in Alaska. In other words, the value of the option to participate in Alaska's halibut sport 
fishery is ubiquitous and relatively concentrated in the lower bounds of the payment card values provided 
in the surveys. Non-resident anglers ultimately incur greater costs associated with fishing in Alaska 
compared with resident anglers. However, non-resident anglers indicated similar WTP in both survey 
versions as did resident anglers and residency was not statistically significant in any of the models for 
determining WTP. Results suggest that only a minimal portion of an anglers total WTP for fishing 
opportunities in Alaska is specific to halibut fishing. Alaska charter boat fishing trips in recent years have 
been estimated to range from $300 for a single day trip to about $1500 for a multi-day trip (Lew and 
Larson 2015). Travel costs, lodging, and other expenses are expected to be greater for non-resident 
anglers and studies show that non-resident charter boat trips have a much higher total value for a single­
day fishing trip (Lew and Larson 2012). Given the large costs associated with charter fishing in Alaska, 
the findings presented in this thesis could suggest that a $20 -$30 halibut stamp would likely be viewed as 
an insignificant additional cost relative to total charter fishing costs in Alaska. Bid estimates across both 
survey versions were heavily concentrated in the $10-$30 range. This high concentration of bid values 
were selected by anglers who have a history of charter halibut fishing, anglers who have a history of un­
guided halibut fishing, and anglers who indicated that they had never fished for halibut in Alaska and 
have no future intention of fishing for halibut, implying that the bid values represent an option given the 
requirement to obtain a halibut stamp to participate in Alaska's recreational halibut fishery. The ability to 
charter halibut fish under less restrictive management measures is secondary and statistically insignificant 
in our findings.
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Socio-demographic characteristics, except for employment and education in the pooled models, 
were statistically insignificant in determining WTP. These findings are not surprising because fishing is 
an expensive leisure activity. Fully employed respondents are more likely to have income that could 
support the financial demands of recreational fishing and retired respondents would be expected to have 
the leisure time to participate in leisure activities. Education at varying college levels were found to be 
statistically significant in Model 3A and 3B which include all responses from both survey versions. 
Statistically significant coefficients in these models indicate an increase in WTP that ranges from $12.37- 
$19.04. Education is understood as improving WTP and the pooled models, Model 3A and 3B are 
preferred in capturing angler response to the RQE program.
Finally, this study suggests two areas for continued research. First, these results and findings 
analyze WTP estimates from anglers who held a sport fishing license in Alaska in 2017 irrespective of 
whether they fished for halibut. Future studies could benefit from narrowing the sample frame to halibut 
anglers or more specifically, charter halibut anglers. A tighter sample frame would have greater power to 
discern the likely response of anglers to a halibut stamp requirement for funding the RQE program. 
Second, attributes of charter fishing trips are likely to be important in determining the WTP amount for a 
stamp allowing an angler to halibut fish. The present study opted not to include charter fishing trip 
attributes such as day trips or lodge experiences, which often include multiple fishing days targeting 
multiple species as well as other activities such as bear viewing or whale watching due to the constraints 
from a broad sampling frame. This issue is left as a potential area for future research and continued 
analysis of Alaska's new charter halibut fishery management plan, the RQE.
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